Alongside significant gains in our understanding of the human mind, research in Cognitive Science has produced substantial evidence that the details of cognitive processes vary across cultures, contexts, and individuals. In order to arrive at a more nuanced account of the workings of the human mind, in this letter we argue that one challenge for the future of Cognitive Science is the integration of this evidence of variation with findings which can be generalized.

What aspects of spatial relations influence speakers’ choice of locative? This article presents a study of static spatial descriptions from 24 languages. The study reveals two kinds of spatial terms evident cross‐linguistically: specific spatial terms and general spatial terms (GSTs). Whereas specific spatial terms—including English prepositions—occur in a limited range of situations, with concomitant specificity in their meaning, GSTs occur in all spatial descriptions (in languages that employ them). Because of the extreme differences in range of application, the two are (...) considered separately. A multidimensional scaling analysis is used with specific spatial terms to extract statistically valid similarities across the languages sampled. For GSTs, which have not been previously analyzed in the literature, a semantic analysis is proposed and experimentally validated. The results suggest the importance of geometry, function, and qualitative physics to the meanings of both kinds of spatial terms, although the details differ. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Cognitive Linguistics Jahrgang: 26 Heft: 4 Seiten: 633-656.

Assuming that linguistic representation has been studied only by linguists using grammaticality judgments, Branigan & Pickering present structural priming as a novel alternative. We show that their assumptions are incorrect for cognitive-functional linguistics, exposing converging perspectives on form/meaning pairings between generativists and cognitive-functional linguists that we hope will spark the cross-disciplinary discussion necessary to produce a cognitively plausible model of linguistic representation.

This chapter draws upon the archaeological and philosophical literature to offer an analysis and diagnosis of the popular ‘ancient aliens’ theory. First, we argue that ancient aliens theory is a form of conspiracy theory. Second, we argue that it differs from other familiar conspiracy theories because it does distinctive ideological work. Third, we argue that ancient aliens theory is a form of non-contextualized inquiry that sacrifices the very thing that makes archaeological research successful, and does so for the sake of (...) popular accessibility. Rather than merely dismissing ancient aliens as ‘pseudoarchaeology’ on demarcationist grounds, we offer a more complicated account of how the theory works, and what ideological work it does. (shrink)

In English, two deictic space-time metaphors are in common usage: the Moving Ego metaphor conceptualizes the ego as moving forward through time and the Moving Time metaphor conceptualizes time as moving forward toward the ego . Although earlier research investigating the psychological reality of these metaphors has typically examined spatial influences on temporal reasoning , recent lines of research have extended beyond this, providing initial evidence that personality differences and emotional experiences may also influence how people reason about events in (...) time . In this article, we investigate whether these relationships have force in real life. Building on the effects of individual differences in self-reported conscientiousness and procrastination found by Duffy and Feist , we examined whether, in addition to self-reported conscientiousness and procrastination, there is a relationship between conscientious and procrastinating behaviors and temporal perspective. We found that participants who adopted the Moving Time perspective were more likely to exhibit conscientious behaviors, while those who adopted the Moving Ego perspective were more likely to procrastinate, suggesting that the earlier effects reach beyond the laboratory. (shrink)

Two types of variables impact face recognition: estimator variables that cannot be controlled and system variables that are under direct control by the criminal justice system. This article addresses some of the reasons that eyewitnesses are prone to making errors, particularly false identifications. It provides a discussion of the differences between typical facial memory and eyewitness studies and shows that the two areas generally find similar results. It reviews estimator variable effects and focuses on system variables. Traditional facial recognition researchers (...) rarely study system variables but reveal important factors that police and policy makers should consider with regard to eyewitness identification and the courts. It concludes that there is still room for considerable improvement in identification procedures and wants to encourage more system variable research as a means of reducing wrongful convictions. (shrink)

This collection of essays is based on the 2005 Society for American Archaeology symposium and presents research that epitomizes Richard I. Ford’s approach of engaged anthropology. This transdisciplinary approach integrates archaeological research with perspectives from ethnography, history, and ecology, and engages the anthropologist with Native partners and with socio-natural landscapes. Research papers largely focus on the U.S. Southwest, but also consider other areas of North America, issues related to museums collections, and indigenous approaches to materials research.

Veils -- Boxes -- Tables -- Visit -- Joy.

I would like to suggest another way to go further toward a new economy of power relations, a way which is more empirical, more directly related to our present situation, and which implies more relations between theory and practice. It consists of taking the forms of resistance against different forms of power as a starting point. To use another metaphor, t consists of using this resistance as a chemical catalyst so as to bring to light power relations, locate their position, (...) and find out their point of application and the methods used. Rather than analyzing power from the point of view of its internal rationality, it consists of analyzing power relations through the antagonism of strategies.[…]Let us come back to the definition of the exercise of power as a way in which certain actions may structure the field of other possible actions. What, therefore, would be proper to a relationship of power is that it be a mode of action upon actions. That is to say, power relations are rooted deep in the social nexus, not reconstituted "above" society as a supplementary structure whose radical effacement one could perhaps dream of. In any case, to live in a society is to live in such a way that action upon other actions is possible-- and in fact ongoing. A society without power relations can only be an abstraction. Which, be it said in passing, makes all the more politically necessary the analysis of power relations in a given society, their historical formation, the source of their strength or fragility, the conditions which are necessary to transform some or to abolish others. For to say that there cannot be a society without power relations is not to say either that those which are established are necessary or, in any case, that power constitutes a fatality at the heart of societies, such that it cannot be undermined. Instead, I would say that the analysis, elaboration, and bringing into question of power relations and the "agonism" between power relations and the instransitivity of freedom is a permanent political task inherent in all social existence.[…]In effect, between a relationship of power and a strategy of struggle there is a reciprocal appeal, a perpetual linking and a perpetual reversal. At every moment the relationship of power may become a confrontation between two adversaries. Equally, the relationship between adversaries in society may, at every moment, give place to the putting into operation of mechanisms of power. The consequence of this instability is the ability to decipher the same events and the same transformations either from inside the history of struggle or from the standpoint of the power relationships. The interpretations which result will not consist of the same elements of meaning or the same links or the same types of intelligibility, although they refer to the same historical fabric, and each of the two analyses must have reference to the other. In fact, it is precisely the disparities between the two readings which make visible those fundamental phenomena of "domination" which are present in a large number of human societies.Michel Foucault has been teaching at the Collège de France since 1970. His works include Madness and Civilization , The Birth of the Clinic , Discipline and Punish , and History of Sexuality , the first volume of a projected five-volume study. (shrink)

According to Husserl, the epochè (or suspension of judgment) must be left incomplete. It is to be performed step by step, thus defining various layers of “reduction.” In phenomenology at least two such layers can be distinguished: the life-world reduction, and the transcendental reduction. Quantum physics was born from a particular variety of the life-world reduction: reduction to observables according to Heisenberg, and reduction to classical-like properties of experimental devices according to Bohr. But QBism has challenged this limited version of (...) the phenomenological reduction advocated by the Copenhagen interpretation. QBists claim that quantum states are “expectations about experiences of pointer readings,” rather than expectations about pointer positions. Their focus on lived experience, not just on macroscopic variables, is tantamount to performing the transcendental reduction instead of stopping at the relatively superficial layer of the life-world reduction. I will show that quantum physics indeed gives us several reasons to go the whole way down to the deepest variety of phenomenological reduction, may be even farther than the standard QBist view: not only reduction to experience, or to “pure consciousness,” but also reduction to the “living present.”. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 25.2 (2001) 233-250 [Access article in PDF] Narrative Theory and Function: Why Evolution Matters Michelle Scalise Sugiyama I It may seem a strange proposition that the study of human evolution is integral to the study of literature, yet that is exactly what this paper proposes. The reasons for this are twofold. Firstly, the practice of storytelling is ancient, pre-dating not only the advent of writing, (...) but of agriculture and permanent settlement as well. Secondly, narrative is ultimately a product of the mind, which in turn is the product of a long history of evolution by natural selection. Thus, an understanding of why and how humans create and consume narrative requires an understanding of (1) features of ancestral environments and (2) features of the mind that made the emergence of this phenomenon possible.There can be little doubt that narrative emerged in human prehistory. Language, an obvious prerequisite for storytelling, is likely to have emerged by at least 50,000 and possibly 250,000 years ago, depending upon whether one places one's trust in archaeological or anatomical evidence. 1 The most reasonable estimate is offered by Geoffrey Miller, who points out that, given its universality, the language faculty must have emerged by the time ancestral Homo sapiens began migrating out of Africa approximately 100,000 years ago. 2 Although the oldest known written narrative (The Epic of Gilgamesh) dates back only 5,000 years, the written literary traditions of many ancient cultures are known to be rooted in longstanding oral traditions. 3 The fact that many modern foraging peoples have rich and complex oral traditions further suggests that the emergence of narrative is not linked to the development of agriculture 10,000 years ago. Moreover, other forms of symbolic expression, such as the cave paintings, Venus figurines, and engraved bone [End Page 233] and antler that have been found at various sites throughout Europe, date back approximately 30,000 years, and rock paintings in Australia may date back even farther. 4 Since humans were physiologically capable of speech long before they began producing these artifacts, storytelling is likely to be at least as ancient as these other representational forms. Indeed, one scholar situates the "dawn of the oral tradition" within this period (Pfeiffer, p. 189). Given, then, that modern humans (Homo sapiens sapiens) have been in existence for approximately 100,000 years 5 and are the only hominid species or subspecies known for certain to exhibit storytelling behavior, we can safely say that oral narrative is a product of our hunting-and-gathering past, likely to have emerged between 30,000 and 100,000 years ago.The universality of narrative is further testimony to its being an ancient cognitive phenomenon. Literate or not, all known cultures, past and present, practice storytelling. 6 Moreover, all normally developing humans acquire the ability to process and generate stories: studies of Western children indicate that the ability to tell stories emerges spontaneously between the ages of two-and-a-half and three, and children as young as thirty months can distinguish between narrative and non-narrative uses of language. 7 In contrast to reading, writing, and arithmetic, no special education is required for narrative competence to develop, nor is there any evidence that oral literacy is acquired through contact with other cultures; although subject matter is often exchanged between groups, the practice of storytelling itself arises independently among even the most isolated peoples. Nor does any type of culture have a monopoly on narrative sophistication: the stories of hunter-horticulturalist societies are no less observant, insightful, or artful than those of agrarian or industrial societies.As with language, narrative takes the same basic form across cultures, which David Bordwell and Kristin Thompson define as "a chain of events in cause-effect relationship occurring in time." Given the preponderance of human agents in narrative, most narrative theorists would probably modify this barebones description to include character (usually understood to have a human psychology), goal-oriented action, and resolution. Frank Kermode, for example, defines the "proprieties" of narrative as "connexity, closure, and character," and John... (shrink)

Essays by two prominent French writers analyze each other's writings and intellectual works.

The explicit topic of Fear and Trembling's third Problema (the longest single section, accounting for a third of the book's total length), the theme of Abraham's silence stands not far in the background in every other section, and its importance is flagged by the pseudonym—Johannes de silentio—under which Kierkegaard had the book published. Here I aim to defend an interpretation of the meaning of the third Problema's central claim—that Abraham cannot explain himself, 'cannot speak'—and to argue on its basis for (...) an interpretation of the work as a whole. (shrink)

This is the chapter on general relativity for the Cambridge Companion to Einstein which I am co-editing with Christoph Lehner.

Michel Seymour | : Dans ce texte, j’examine sur un mode programmatique la relation qui existe entre les peuples et les territoires. Les frontières des peuples souverains sont-elles sacrées, naturelles et absolues, voire irréfragables ? Le territoire a-t-il une importance identitaire ? Si oui, cette relation identitaire repose-t-elle sur l’attachement sentimental des citoyens ou sur une préférence rationnelle ? Doit-on plutôt l’expliquer par un rapport historique ? Le territoire est-il un élément constitutif de l’identité d’un peuple ? Le principe de (...) l’intégrité du territoire a-t-il une priorité absolue sur le principe affirmant le droit à l’autodétermination des peuples ? Tel est l’éventail de questions qui peuvent être posées en ce qui concerne la relation entre les peuples et leurs territoires. Je veux présenter une perspective qui me semble être originale. Dans la perspective du libéralisme politique, je pars d’une conception institutionnelle du peuple. Je me propose d’indiquer ensuite comment cette approche permet d’envisager des réponses à ces questions. | : In this paper, I examine in a programmatic fashion the relationship between peoples and territories. Are the borders of sovereign peoples sacred, natural and absolute, or even irrebuttable ? Does territory plays an important role for identity ? If so, is this relationship based on the sentimental attachment of citizens or on a rational preference ? Should it be explained instead by a historical relationship ? Is territory even constitutive of the identity of a people ? Does the principle of territorial integrity have priority over the principle asserting the right to self-determination of peoples ? Such are the issues that can be raised concerning the relationship between peoples and their territories. I want to present an account that I take to be original. In accordance with political liberalism, I start from an institutional conception of peoples. I then indicate how this approach allows to consider answers to some of these questions. (shrink)

This paper investigates the topic of expertise in cognitive domains from a socio-epistemological perspective. In particular, two central questions in the epistemology of expertise are discussed: what an expert is according to extant theories on the market; and how ordinary people can identify an expert in domains in which they have no competence of their own.

This paper examines two influential theoretical frameworks, set forth by Russell Barkley (1997) and Thomas Brown (2005), and argues that important headway in understanding attention deficit hyperactivity disorder can be made if we acknowledge the way in which human cognition and action are essentially embodied and enactive. The way in which we actively make sense of the world is structured by our bodily dynamics and our sensorimotor engagement with our surroundings. These bodily dynamics are linked to an individual's concerns and (...) felt needs, so that what she attends to in perception, decision-making, and action is partially constituted by her cares and concerns. What I call ?affective framing? engages the whole living body, and ordinarily contributes to attentional focusing, working memory, goal-formulation, and action-monitoring. However, due to affective framing deficits, subjects with ADHD find it difficult to focus their attention, kindle their motivation, and systematically simplify cognitive procedures according to considerations of relevance, salience, and context. Thus, what is impaired in ADHD is not simply a set of executive brain functions, but rather a range of bodily dynamics through which subjects engage with their world. For this reason, intensive behavioral intervention that engages the whole living body may be the most effective, lasting treatment for ADHD. (shrink)

This paper is essentially a quantum philosophical challenge: starting from simple assumptions, we argue about an ontological approach to quantum mechanics. In this paper, we will focus only on the assumptions. While these assumptions seems to solve the ontological aspect of theory many others epistemological problems arise. For these reasons, in order to prove these assumptions, we need to find a consistent mathematical context (i.e. time reverse problem, quantum entanglement, implications on quantum fields, Schr¨odinger cat states, the role of observer, (...) the role of mind ). (shrink)

Physiologically accurate mouse models of cancer are critical in the pre‐clinical development of novel cancer therapies. However, current standardized animal‐housing temperatures elicit chronic cold‐associated stress in mice, which is further increased in the presence of tumor. This cold‐stress significantly impacts experimental outcomes. Data from our lab and others suggest standard housing fundamentally alters murine physiology, and this can produce altered immune baselines in tumor and other disease models. Researchers may thus underestimate the efficacy of therapies that are benefitted by immune (...) responses. A potential mediator, norepinephrine, also underlies stress pathways common in mice and humans. Therefore, research into mechanisms connecting cold‐stress and norepinephrine signaling with immune depression in mice could highlight new combination therapies for humans to simultaneously target stress while stimulating anti‐tumor immunity. (shrink)

Abstract:In this paper, I dispute what I callpsychological internalismabout moral responsibility, which comprises most classic accounts as well as newer neurobiological ones, and I defendpsychological externalismabout moral responsibility instead. According to psychological internalism, an agent's moral responsibility is determined solely or primarily by her intentional states. I argue that psychological internalism is empirically challenged by recent findings in social psychology and cognitive science. In light of the empirical evidence, I contend that moral responsibility depends on historical and environmental factors to (...) a much greater degree than previously appreciated. Thus, moral responsibility is not just in the head: indeed, it is much less in the head than typically assumed. (shrink)

Zeugmatic oddness is a linguistic intuition of oddness with respect to an instance of zeugma, i.e. a sentence containing an instance of a homonymous or polysemous word being used in different meanings or senses simultaneously. Zeugmatic oddness is important for philosophical debates as philosophers often use it to argue that a particular philosophically interesting expression is ambiguous and that the phenomenon referred to by the expression is disunified. This paper takes a closer look at zeugmatic oddness. Focusing on relevant psycholinguistic (...) literature on homonymy and polysemy processing and representation, I argue that there are two different ways in which zeugmatic oddness can arise. Philosophical upshots concerning zeugmatic oddness are then drawn. (shrink)

L’histoire du texte des Régles pour la Direction de l’Esprit (Regulae) de Descartes est un peu singulière: non publié du vivant de Descartes, il n’a paru qu’en 1701, dans les Opera Posthuma d’Amsterdam. De façon plus significative, et contrairement aux autres traités cartésiens perdus, ce texte secret n’est jamais explicitement evoqué par Descartes, fût-ce au détour d’une correspondance. Par leur étroite dépendance vis à vis des mathématiques, les Regulae sont cependant un texte majeur, constitutives de la pensée de leur auteur (...) dans ses années de jeunesse (1619-1628), et par là de toute la philosophie moderne. Descartes avait jugé le texte suffisamment important pour I’emmener à Stockholm, où il a été découvert apres sa mort, dans ses papiers.Entre les mathématiques et les Regulae, ce texte “éclatant et obscur” (J.P. Weber), il est ces trois types principaux de rapports croisés que nous tâcherons d’analyser: historiquement d’abord, quelles furent la formation et I’expérience mathématique du jeune Descartes, qui constituerent, à notre sens, I’armature conceptuelle du texte. Quelles sont ensuite les voies par lesquelles, dans les Regulae, Descartes a putransmuer cette expérience mathématique premiere à la fois en une pratique, une méthode, une théorie de la connaissance, enfin en une épistémologie assez radicalement neuve. Enfin, et prenant Descartes au sérieux nous examinerons à I’occasion cette question: quel est le sort réservé, de nos jours, à cette épistémologie cartésienne, en particulier confrontée aux mathématiques contemporaines? (shrink)

Here I investigate the possibility of a phenomenological approach to Christianity, with the understanding that this would not be a matter of proposing an interpretation, but that such an “approach” would be able to lead directly to the heart of Christianity. I will say immediately that a phenomenology that would be able to undertake such a task is not the historical phenomenology that was born with Husserl. Only an ideal phenomenology that would become what is required would be able to (...) respond to our investigation. This ideal phenomenology is a phenomenology of life. (shrink)

The debate about the nature of the representational format of concepts seems to have reached an impasse. The debate faces two fundamental problems. Firstly, amodalists (i.e., those who argue that concepts are represented by amodal symbols) and modalists (i.e., those who see concepts as involving crucially representations including sensorimotor information) claim that the same empirical evidence is compatible with their views. Secondly, there is no shared understanding of what a modal or amodal format amounts to. Both camps recognize that the (...) two formats play essential roles in higher cognition, leading to an increasing number of hybrid proposals. In this paper, I argue that the existence of those fundamental problems should make us suspicious about a modal/amodal dichotomy. Also, I suggest that hybrid approaches, as they currently stand, do not provide suitable solutions to the impasse. Instead, we should overcome the dichotomy and treat the modal/amodal distinction as a graded phenomenon. I illustrate this hypothesis with an example of a cognitive-computational model of concepts based on the Predictive Processing framework. (shrink)

This article attempts a philosophical defense of an autonomy-based approach to multicultural education. I contend that multicultural education is necessary in order for students to be able to develop personal autonomy. This, in turn, can empower students to effectively formulate their own version of the good life. The development of autonomy need not, as many critics claim, promote atomistic individualism. Rather, contemporary liberal autonomy strives for a balance between the individual and the community. In defending multicultural education, my argument relies (...) on Joseph Raz's notion of autonomy and Will Kymlicka's concept of a context of choice. I conclude that through multicultural education, students can expand their contexts of choice and consequently develop individual autonomy, an essential ingredient of the good life. (shrink)

Lectures at the Collège de France, 1973-1974. Ed. Jacques Lagrange, trans. Graham Burchell, intro. Arnold I. Davidson,. Extract from Chapter One, 7 November 1973.

A substantial part of my reconstruction can aheady be found, in a very condensed form, in the annotauon for the relevant pages of the Einstein-Besso manuscript in Einstein CP4: doc. 14, pp. [41— 42]. The letter to Freundlich and other correspondence from the period 1915 — 1917 that I drew on for this paper appear in Einstein CPS. I wrote this paper in the context of a larger project of the Maxplanck-Institut flir Wissenschaflsgeschichte which aims at giving the most detailed (...) reconstruction yet of Einstein's path to general relativity. My paper does not necessarily reflect the views of the other members of the group working on this project. See Renn tk Sauer 1996 for a preliminary report on the gmup's findings. (shrink)

At first glance, Moritz Geiger’s reaction to Husserl’s Ideas I appears to be neither systematically articulated nor particularly original. Geiger talks about Husserl’s idealism in Ideas I in just a few passages from his book Die Wirklickheit der Wissenschaften und die Metaphysik, and in a short essay in praise of Alexander Pfänder, Alexander Pfänders Methodische Stellung. There, Geiger seems to follow a general line of criticism shared by several so-called early phenomenologists, and most fully articulated by Jean Hering, Roman Ingarden, (...) Theodor Celms and Max Scheler. In this paper I argue that Geiger’s reaction to Ideas I contains some well-developed and original contributions to phenomenological thought. In particular, I defend three theses. First, Geiger’s criticism of Husserl’s idealism is much more original and sophisticated than it at first appears, because it rests on a complex phenomenology of “attitudes” [Einstellungen]. Second, Geiger offers a unique account of phenomenology as a variation of “stance” [Haltung], rather than a variation of attitude. Third, Geiger points to an alternative kind of phenomenology, which I call certainty-based phenomenology as opposed to an evidence-based phenomenology. Elements of this certainty-based phenomenology can be found in thinkers such as Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur, but many of their views are significantly anticipated by Geiger. (shrink)

A part of the “return to religion” now evident in European philosophy, this book represents the culmination of the career of a leading phenomenological thinker whose earlier works trace a trajectory from Marx through a genealogy of psychoanalysis that interprets Descartes’s “I think, I am” as “I feel myself thinking, I am.” In this book, Henry does not ask whether Christianity is “true” or “false.” Rather, what is in question here is what Christianity considers as truth, what kind of truth (...) it offers to people, what it endeavors to communicate to them, not as a theoretical and indifferent truth, but as the essential truth that by some mysterious affinity is suitable for them, to the point that it alone is capable of ensuring them salvation. In the process, Henry inevitably argues against the concept of truth that dominates modern thought and determines, in its multiple implications, the world in which we live. Henry argues that Christ undoes “the truth of the world,” that He is an access to the infinity of self-love, to a radical subjectivity that admits no outside, to the immanence of affective life found beyond the despair fatally attached to all objectifying thought. The Kingdom of God accomplishes itself in the here and now through the love of Christ in what Henry calls “the auto-affection of Life.” In this condition, he argues, all problems of lack, ambivalence, and false projection are resolved. (shrink)

In this paper I take up the question of the nature of the doxastic attitudes we entertain while inquiring into some matter. Relying on a distinction between two stages of open inquiry, I urge to acknowledge the existence of a distinctive attitude of cognitive inclination towards a proposition qua answer to the question one is inquiring into. I call this attitude “hypothesis”. Hypothesis, I argue, is a sui generis doxastic attitude which differs, both functionally and normatively, from suspended judgement, full (...) belief, credences, and acceptance. In closing, I point to the epistemological significance of hypothesis. More specifically, I contend that holding an attitude of hypothesis enables us to respond rationally to peer disagreement, and I suggest that such an attitude offers a suitable articulation of the view, originally put forward by Philip Kitcher, that cognitive diversity in inquiry has epistemic benefits. (shrink)

For John Dewey, philosophy is "the theory of education in its most general aspects." Throughout history we see a close tie between an author's philosophical thought and his educational principles. Jacques Maritain is quite aware of this, and manifests it in his own writing. In Maritain the educational theorist is Maritain the metaphysician. His metaphysics of the human person and of human action, of knowledge and free will, treated in Existence and the Existent, are at the heart of Towards a (...) Philosophy of Education, not only in a general way but even in its practical application, such as the choice of a curriculum and the pedagogical methods used. (shrink)